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Session 10
EMERGING POLICY AND PRACTICE ISSUES
Steven L. Schooner
Nash & Cibinic Professor of Government Contracts Law
The George Washington University Law School
David J. Berteau
Director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Washington D.C.
I.

THIS YEAR, IT’S ALL ABOUT THE MONEY

A. Did We Mention There’s Not Enough Money? The emerging issue in government contracting,
looking ahead, is the money (or lack of it). As the fiscal belt tightens, the procurement landscape—what
the government buys, from whom, and how—will necessarily change. The Obama administration has
made clear that no stone will remain unturned in the effort to achieve savings. Everything, apparently, is on the table…. except, of course, for the muffins! DOJ Conference Muffins Come Under Heat
From IG, 53 GC ¶ 311 (The DOJ inspector general reported that DOJ “did not always minimize costs
for event planning and food and beverages at conferences[.]” Moreover, “conferences featured costly
meals, refreshments [e.g., $16 for muffins and $8 for cups of coffee], and themed breaks … indicative
of wasteful or extravagant spending[.]”) Developments In Brief: Those Muffins Did Not Cost $16, After
All, 53 GC ¶ 369(b) (DOJ IG issued a revised report superseding its earlier report and “determined
that [its] initial conclusions concerning the itemized costs of refreshments at the … conference were
incorrect and that the Department did not pay $16 per muffin.”)
Given the budget uncertainties, the potential for short-term disruption is enormous. Elizabeth
A. Ferrell, Feature Comment: Implications Of Funding Shortfalls And Budget Cuts For Government
Contractors, 53 GC ¶ 167 (discussing continuing resolutions, de-scoping, stretch-outs, production
breaks, terminations, (the enormous risks associated with) self-funding, and, of course, Nunn-McCurdy
Implications). Ferrell paints a stark picture and offers frank advice:
The fiscal crisis will drive agencies to take drastic action to reduce procurement spending.
Contractors need to prepare for the inevitable. … [C]ontractors should assess programmatic
vulnerabilities caused by changes in threats, roles and missions; changes in technology; changes
in priorities; and cost and schedule growth.… [They] should understand the Government’s
most current assessment of a program’s technology, design and production maturity, and other
programmatic issues. … [They] should reexamine their portfolios, determine what makes longterm strategic sense, and develop a procurement advocacy plan…. [They] should assess their
contractual vulnerabilities, including performance status…. [C]ontractors should prepare for a
possible termination…. [M]ost importantly, contractors should regularly track contract funding
status and identify potential limitation of costs/funds issues, since contractors that incur costs
in excess of funding are at risk that those costs will never be reimbursed by the Government.

B. Is the Government Serious About Saving Money? One of the fascinating things about the
government-contractor relationship is that neither the customer nor the vendor control all of the significant cost drivers. In a terrific example of this, the Postal Service Inspector General (IG) published
a report stating the (blatantly) obvious proposition that, in order to achieve savings: “[t]he Postal
Service should seek an exemption from the Service Contract Act [SCA] to negotiate contract rates
closer to market rates[.]” SCA Exemption, Outsourcing Could Cut Postal Service Costs, 53 GC ¶ 375.
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Among other things, the IG “identified six contract labor categories with
higher SCA rates than market rates. … SCA rates for snow removal and
landscaping were 34 percent higher than market rates, cleaning/janitorial
rates were 33 percent higher, and unarmed guard rates were 31 percent
higher.” But equally fascinating was the fact that:
[I]n-house Postal Service labor rates significantly exceeded SCA
rates. The Postal Service’s cleaning/janitorial rate of $44.51 per
hour was 283 percent higher than the SCA rate of $15.74, and
the Postal Service rate for postal-vehicle service drivers was
$47.89, or 180 percent higher than the $26.63 SCA rate.

Of course, these types of savings could make a real difference. “The Postal
Service’s financial outlook is poor and labor costs account for 80 percent of
its costs[.]” In addition, the IG acknowledged some of the related barriers
to outsourcing (both at the Postal Service and across the Government),
including “current labor union agreements, concerns that new unions will
be formed, workforce retention issues, fluctuations in market or economic
conditions, and the potential for congressional constituency concerns.” But
don’t hold your breath on major changes in this area.
A model based on strong Congressional leadership and bipartisan
cooperation could facilitate the government’s efforts to manage its fiscal, as well as any contracting, woes. See, e.g., Senators Call On Super
Committee To Lower Government Contracting Costs, 53 GC ¶ 350 (Senators “support the administration’s efforts to reduce wasteful spending
in Government contracting, including the use of strategic sourcing to
leverage the Government’s buying power and the termination of failing
[IT] contracts. They also endorse the call for agencies to stop using costreimbursement and non-competitive contracts. Although it is difficult to
determine cost savings from these initiatives, as well as the push to ensure
inherently governmental jobs are not filled by contractors, the senators
said that the impact on the budget will be positive.” (Emphasis added.)
These “recommendations also include capping reimbursement of federal
contractor executives.”) Unfortunately, no such model exists. Bingham C.
Jamison, The Super Committee: Failure at Any Cost, Time (December 20,
2011), available at http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2011/12/20/the-supercommittee-failure-at-any-cost/ (“It comes as no surprise that the bicameral
and bipartisan super committee — that 12-person debt panel charged with
finding $1.2 trillion in deficit savings over the next 10 years — failed in
its mandate. … One look at the members of the super committee sheds
light on some troubling trends in Congress writ large, and perhaps partly
explains its failure.”).
The new facts of life are that the government will spend less money
for the foreseeable future—we don’t yet know how much. In addition, the
government’s spending priorities will change. We don’t yet know which
programs will be cancelled, or which resources will be reallocated, but
change is in the air. Yes, there have been—and there will continue to be—
significant changes in leadership. New and different issues will continue
to challenge acquisition professionals. But the big story looking ahead in
2012 and beyond anticipates seismic changes, and potential course corrections, after a decade-long growth trend finally reverses itself.
© 2012 Thomson Reuters
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II.	OPEN LEADERSHIP ISSUES
With the close of 2011, we applaud the service of Daniel Gordon as the
Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP). OFPP
churned out a fair amount of work product before Administrator Gordon’s
exit. As the White House explained:
On Dan’s watch, spending on federal contracting decreased for
the first time in more than a dozen years…. Dan has worked
with the [GSA], buying agencies, and industry, to reform the
way the government buys commodities … so that we are—
finally—leveraging the federal government’s purchasing
power as the world’s largest customer…. Dan has also helped
unleash the talent and ingenuity of the federal workforce, so
that innovative buying methods, such as electronic reverse
auctions, are encouraged and adopted. … Dan has demonstrated
a commitment to listening to the concerns of all stakeholders,
launching a ‘Myth-Busters’ campaign to promote more open
communication between the government and industry …, and
developing a pathbreaking policy letter that clarifies the line
between work that can be contracted out and work that is
inherently governmental. … Dan has helped … strengthen… the
… acquisition workforce…, the Administration’s commitment
to tightening oversight of contractors, …, [and] the contract
management role of [CORs]….

Jack Lew, News from OFPP, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
blog/2011/11/02/news-ofpp; Gordon to Leave OFPP, 53 GC ¶ 369(d). As
we approach 2012, we are curious to see what the administration has in
store—not only in terms of leadership, but in terms of policy in an election
year. As of December, the media had reported that Joseph Jordan, thenserving as the SBA’s associate administrator of government contracting
and business development, would assume a senior advisory role in OMB.
The media (promptly and consistently) speculated that the administration
could nominate Jordon to replace Dan Gordon as the OFPP administrator.
III. TRENDS: FINALLY, THE END OF THE POST-MILLENIUM
Procurement Spending BINGE
A. A New Economic Reality? This chapter’s coverage of the federal procurement spending trend has steadily increased. This year is no
different, but we also look further back to put the trend in context (and
attempt to predict—or guess what lies ahead in—the future). It’s easy to
forget that, while federal procurement spending was always significant, it
wasn’t always this significant. Just consider: In Fiscal Year 2001, federal
procurement spending rose to just over $223 billion. The following years,
in 2002 and 2003, we witnessed 18 and 20 percent spending increases.
Entering 2012, we just completed the fourth consecutive fiscal year in
which federal procurement spending exceeded $535 billion.
It’s no secret how we got here (but, again, we’re here). Using adjusted
figures (yes, between the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) and
USASpending.gov, history is consistently being re-written), it appears
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that the annual increases in federal procurement—from 2001 through
2008—were never less than three times the rate of inflation. The experts
correctly predicted that the growth rate eventually would taper; in 2009,
the rate slowed and, apparently, growth finally stalled. Yet, in retrospect,
the dire warnings that the current spending binge was a blip—and that
procurement spending would promptly retract—were unfounded.
Now there seems to be greater consensus and empirical evidence that
the procurement spending growth cycle finally has run its course. But the
news is not all bad for contractors in that—at least for now—the plateau
represents the high-end of a robust and sustained growth curve.
Federal Procurement Spending 2001-2011*
Fiscal
Year

Procurement Spending
(in Billions of Dollars)

Percentage Increase
or (Decrease) From
Previous Year

Percentage Increase or
(Decrease) in Consumer
Price Index (CPI)

2011

$535.1*

(~1)

3.4*

2010

$537.7 ($534.5)†

(~1)

0.1

2009

$541.3 ($540.4)

(~0)

(0.4)

2008

$541.8 ($541.3)

13.9

3.8

2007

$475.3 ($475.0)

10.5

2.8

2006

$432.0 ($429.8)

9.8

3.2

2005

$391.2

13.1

3.4

2004

$346.4 ($345.8)

8.8

2.7

2003

$318.3 ($317.7)

20.6

2.3

2002

$263.4

18.0

1.6

2001

$223.1

*FY 2011 figures reflect preliminary reporting.
† Dollar figures in parenthesis reflect last year’s reported numbers. Other parentheticals reflect
negative numbers.

See www.USASpending.gov. Annual increases in the Consumer Price
Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) were extracted from the annual
Detailed Report Tables, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpid1111.pdf.
B. Big Business, Major Players. Looking behind the data, the concentration of spending amongst the largest contracting agencies and government contractors remains significant. For example, for fiscal year 2011:
•

The Defense Department accounted for 70 percent of the total
procurement dollars awarded. (That’s quite high, up again,
ever-so-slightly from the (seemingly high) 69 percent last year.)

•

The seven largest procuring agencies (DoD, Energy, HHS, GSA,
NASA, VA, and DHS) accounted for just under 90 percent of
the total dollars awarded.

•

The 100 largest federal contractors received more than $284
billion in contracts (down from $294 billion in FY 2010) or more
than half (almost 54 percent) of the total dollars awarded.
• Conversely, the 571,437 contract actions (an increase of approximately ten percent over FY 2010) these 100 firms, as a

© 2012 Thomson Reuters
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group, received accounted for slightly more than ten percent
of the total actions.
•

The top five federal contractors (Lockheed Martin, Boeing,
Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, and Raytheon—the
same top five as FY 2010) received more than $102 billion
(down approximately ten percent as compared to FY 2010)
in contracts or more than nineteen percent (down from over
twenty-one percent in FY 2010) of the total dollars awarded.

•

Thirty-four firms received contract awards of more than $2
billion (exactly the same number as FY 2010).

•

Seventy-one contractors (two more than in FY 2010) were
awarded, individually, more than $1 billion in contracts.

C. Defense (and Homeland Security): Slicing and Dicing the
Data. For some time, we have become comfortable with the Defense Department accounting for approximately two-thirds of federal procurement
spending. Expectations that an insatiable, ever-morphing Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) might chip away at DoD’s share never transitioned to reality. And, not surprisingly, with sustained military actions
in Iraq and Afghanistan, that share inched upward. This year, however,
we gained additional insights into the modern-era DoD spending trend
line. See, generally, the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, Center for
Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) report, Gregory Sanders, et
al., U.S. Department of Defense Contract Spending and the Supporting
Industrial Base (May 6, 2011), available at http://csis.org/publication/
defense-contract-trends-0. The report tracks DoD Contract spending over
the twenty-year period, 1990-2010. Some of the trends are familiar, others less obvious.
•

Procurement of Services grew at a much faster pace than
products (supplies) or research and development (R&D).
• There was a clear shift in priorities following the end of the
Cold War. Drawing down military and civilian personnel
after the Cold War necessitated an increase in outsourcing to continue providing many services, while spending on
products decreased with the numbers of active-duty military.
• Contract spending on R&D fell relative to other categories
of spending throughout the late 1990s and the 2000’s. Yet
R&D continued to shrink as a percentage of total defense
contract dollars even as the defense budget increased after
2002. Given that the ratio of investment in R&D to the rest
of defense contract spending has been lower over the past
20 years than in previous decades, the benefits that will be
reaped from a drawdown in the coming years may be fewer.

•

The Army’s share of the DoD procurement pie expanded, while
the Navy and Air Force shares declined.
• Army contract spending skyrocketed after 2000. During
the 1990s, the Army accounted for 23-25 percent of total
DoD contract spending. This share grew rapidly from 2002
through 2008, reaching 40 percent of total DoD contract
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spending by 2008. Army contract spending increased by an
average of more than 11.5 percent per year since 1999.
• Despite increased spending by the Marine Corps, Navy
contract spending followed an opposite trend to that of the
Army.
• In an unprecedented development (in the modern era), Air
Force spending declined to the lowest of all DoD components.
•

The top five defense contractors retained their position
from 1999 to 2009. Outside of this small group, however, little
evidence suggests that the defense industry is consolidating
into an oligopoly dominated by a small number of incumbent
firms. Specifically, there were dynamic changes in the composition of the top 20 contractors in the industry over the last 20
years.

•

While small business appears to have increased its share
of the pie, medium-sized contractors appear to have lost
market share to both large and small contractors.

•

At a macro level, DoD awarded the majority of its contract dollars on an increasingly competitive basis towards the end of
the period studied.

•

The share of contract dollars awarded using fixed price contracts grew at a faster rate than cost-based contract awards.
• As we noted last year, through 2009, there was a disturbing
and sudden rise in “combination” contracts, which obfuscated the total distribution of cost and price-based contracts.
Contract spending allocated to this category seems to have
mostly disappeared in 2010.

•

Spending on indefinite delivery vehicles rose sharply in the
last few years, while definitive contracts and purchase orders
stagnated, then declined in 2010.

•

In a separate report, CSIS produced a similar, but more modest
data set for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
tracking trends for 2004-2010 (with the disclaimer that 20022003 mainly reflected DHS start-up costs). Defense-Industrial
Initiatives Group, Center for Strategic & International Studies, DHS Contract Spending and the Supporting Industrial
Base (July 21, 2011), available at http://csis.org/publication/
dhs-contract-spending-and-supporting-industrial-base. CSIS
found that DHS’s contract spending was relatively stable, with
the most fluctuation in FEMA following major disasters. Not
surprisingly, most growth in DHS procurement occurred in
services, with slower growth in products and decreases in R&D.

D. Grants: Follow The Money. For now, it remains little known that,
despite all of the attention focused upon government contracting, grant
spending outpaced procurement spending by more than fifteen percent
over the last decade. While FY 2011 may have been a virtual tie, grant
spending exceeded procurement spending for nine of the last eleven years.
We have not yet analyzed the extraordinary (12 percent) short-term dip
© 2012 Thomson Reuters
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in grant spending in 2007 and 2008, but that pales in comparison to the
(post-crash, stimulus package-infused) 58 percent increase in grant
spending in 2009. We will not be surprised to learn, down the road, that
the wild fluctuations in grant spending derive, in part, from inaccurate
reporting (more on this below); for now these are the best numbers available. As a taxpayer, one might hope or expect that, eventually, the oversight
and regulatory community shifts its focus from procurement to grants. If
the government is serious about reducing its debts and its annual deficits,
this seems unavoidable.
Federal Procurement and Grant Spending 2001-2011*
Fiscal Year

Procurement Spending (in Billions)

Grant Spending (in Billions)

2011

$535.1*

$545.2*

2010

$537.7

$612.7

2009

$541.3

$664.8

2008

$541.8

$418.8

2007

$475.3

$429.9

2006

$432.0

$490.0

2005

$391.2

$441.6

2004

$346.4

$450.1

2003

$318.3

$493.7

2002

$263.4

$406.3

2001

$223.1

$330.8

*FY 2011 reflects preliminary reporting.

Total Federal Spending, www.USASpending.gov.
E. Data Quality: As we’ve noted in the past, the procurement spending data available to the public continues to improve, but plenty of room
for improvement remains. We were encouraged that, on USASpending.
gov, the retrospective adjustments to the previously published spending
data changed far less this year than last. (Re-writing history, when it improves accuracy, is not a bad thing.) Also, if you are a visual learner (or if
you like colorful, moving pictures, cartoons, etc.), you will enjoy the Graph
View option for displaying trends related to, among others, “Prime Award
Spend Data” from 2000 to the present. We particularly recommend the
bubble view (as opposed to the more sedate bar and line graph options). We
encourage you to experiment with the various options which permit you
to manipulate the graphs according to time, type of transaction, amount
of transaction, place of performance, etc.
IV. THE ONGOING DEBATE: Outsourcing-INSOURCING
Last year, we discussed the swinging pendulum that reflects the
outsourcing-insourcing trend of the moment, and that discussion continues. PSC Opposes ‘Insourcing’ Language In Appropriations Bill, 53
GC ¶ 407 (PSC opposes “arbitrary, anti-business language” that would
force the Government to “arbitrarily insource work currently performed
through partnerships between the public and private sectors even
though current law and … guidance deem this work perfectly suitable
for private sector performance based on agency determinations.”); Obama
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Administration Opposes Restriction On Contracting Out Closely Associated Functions, 53 GC ¶ 387 (administration opposes [appropriations]
language … that would require civilian agencies to ensure that services
contracts “exclude to the maximum extent practicable functions that
are closely associated with inherently governmental functions”); OFPP
Issues Guidance On Inherently Governmental Functions, 53 GC ¶ 303;
OMB, OFPP Policy Letter 11–01, Performance of Inherently Governmental
and Critical Functions, 76 Fed. Reg. 56227 (Sept. 12, 2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-09-12/pdf/2011-23165.pdf; House
Republicans Seek Public-Private Competitions, 53 GC ¶ 240 (“Twenty-one
House Republicans recently called for greater use of [OMB] Circular A-76
public-private competitions”); OFPP’s Inherently Governmental Definition Poses Questions, CRS Finds, 53 GC ¶ 17 (“[T]hree key concerns for
Congress are: (1) the relationship between the proposed policy letter and
other executive branch authorities, (2) whether the proposed policy letter
would necessarily result in changes in agencies’ use of contractors for
particular functions[,] and (3) the potential demands on the acquisition
workforce. Especially relevant to Government contractors is whether the
proposed policy letter’s potential treatment of specific functions, such
as the provision of security by contractors, would result in changes to
agencies’ contractor use.”)
The battleground appears to increasingly focus on cost comparison
between federal and contractor performance of services. It is premature
to tell whether this is a meaningful debate or a side show. As we have discussed previously, the lion’s share of the government’s modern-era reliance
on service contractors by-passed any meaningful cost comparison. Rather,
most of the increase derived from an explosion of demand for government
services without a corresponding increase (and, periodically, decreases)
in the federal workforce (and military). Steven L. Schooner & Daniel S.
Greenspahn, Too Dependent on Contractors? Minimum Standards for
Responsible Governance, 6 J. Cont. Mgmt. 9 (Summer 2008); Steven L.
Schooner, Competitive Sourcing Policy: More Sail Than Rudder, 33 Pub.
Cont. L. J. 263 (2004). Of course, that does not make the cost-comparison
debate any less interesting.
The critical document in this context is the OSD Directive-Type
Memorandum (DTM) 09-007, Estimating and Comparing the Full Costs
of Civilian and Military Manpower and Contract Support, (January 29,
2010; changed September 2, 2011) (“It is DoD policy that Defense officials
are aware of the full costs of manpower and have a thorough understanding of the implications of those costs to [DoD] and, on a broader scale,
to the Federal Government when developing national security policies
and making program commitments. ”), available at http://www.dtic.mil/
whs/directives/corres/pdf/DTM-09-007.pdf. But see, generally, DefenseIndustrial Initiatives Group, Center for Strategic & International Studies,
DoD Workforce Cost Realism Assessment (May 2011), available at http://
csis.org/files/publication/110517_Berteau_DoDWorkforceCost_Web.pdf.
“[T]he procedures laid out in the DTM for calculating the government’s
costs for performing a service have several significant gaps [which] raise
questions about the validity of any analysis generated on the basis of the
DTM guidance.” The DTM, among other things:
© 2012 Thomson Reuters
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•

Lacks the ability to calculate fully burdened government wide
costs;

•

Fails to account for the full cost of DoD-owned capital but includes those costs for contractors;

•

Fails to account for taxes forgone by the U.S. Treasury or state
or local governments;

•

Fails to account for the inherent risk of cost growth among
public producers;

•

Overlooks the cumulative effect of multiple insourcing decisions;

•

Overlooks the imputed costs of insuring and indemnifying inhouse producers;

•

Fails to account for non-cost factors, such as varying workload
stability; and

•

Fails to utilize a detailed standard of work as a basis for cost
estimation.

CSIS’s “objective for creating [a separate] Cost Estimation Methodology is
to account for the fully burdened costs to government [which] will create
a level playing field between the public and the private sector, remov[e]
any inherent competitive advantage for both sides, and enable[e] DoD to
harness the cost saving power of competition.”
V.	INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: A NEW APPROACH?
Late in 2010, both OMB and the Defense Department published
significant policy documents suggesting dramatic changes to the government’s approach to purchasing and managing information technology
hardware and services. OMB, DOD Chart New IT Paths, 53 GC ¶ 2; OMB
Roadmap Improving IT Management, But More Should Be Done, Witnesses Say, 53 GC ¶ 127 (“Dashboard data were not always accurate and
were not consistent with agency cost and schedule performance data.”).
Not surprisingly, 2011 saw the government produce a significant body of
literature in this arena.
A. The Role of the CIO.
• OMB Memo M-11-29, Chief Information Officer Authorities (August
8, 2011). Of course, the memo reinforces the message that “[t]oo many
Federal IT projects have run over budget, fallen behind schedule, or failed
to deliver promised functionality, hampering agency missions and wasting taxpayer dollars.” Accordingly, the government “is changing the role
of Agency Chief Information Officers (CIOs) away from just policymaking
and infrastructure maintenance, to encompass true portfolio management
for all IT.” The memo emphasizes four main areas in which CIO’s should
have a “lead role:” Governance, Commodity IT (“eliminating duplication
and rationaliz[ing] their agency’s IT investments”); Program Management;
and Information Security.
• GAO, Federal Chief Information Officers: Opportunities Exist to
Improve Role in Information Technology Management, GAO-11-634 (Sep-
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tember 2011) (“[A]gency CIOs currently are not consistently responsible for
all of the 13 areas assigned by statute or identified as critical to effective
IT management. While the majority of CIOs are primarily responsible for
key IT management areas, they are less likely to have primary responsibility for information management duties.”)
B. Cloud Computing.
• Vivek Kundra, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Federal
Cloud Computing Strategy (February 8, 2011) (“Cloud computing offers
the government an opportunity to be more efficient, agile, and innovative
through more effective use of IT investments, and by applying innovations
developed in the private sector.”) This Strategy is designed to:
•

Articulate the benefits, considerations, and trade-offs of cloud
computing;

•

Provide a decision framework and case examples to support
agencies in migrating towards cloud computing;

•

Highlight cloud computing implementation resources; and

•

Identify Federal Government activities and roles and responsibilities for catalyzing cloud adoption.

“Each agency will re-evaluate its technology sourcing strategy to include
consideration and application of cloud computing solutions as part of
the budget process. Consistent with the Cloud First policy, agencies will
modify their IT portfolios to fully take advantage of the benefits of cloud
computing in order to maximize capacity utilization, improve IT flexibility
and responsiveness, and minimize cost.”
• GSA has taken aggressive steps towards becoming the government’s provider of cloud-related needs. “(GSA) Cloud Information Technology (IT) Services help federal agencies identify and acquire the right cloud
computing solution to meet their IT needs. GSA’s Cloud IT Services provide
convenient, on-demand access to a shared pool of computing resources
that can be rapidly and easily configured, provisioned, and released. These
solutions are delivered through the Internet on a pay-per-use or subscription basis in three service models: Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)...,
Platform as a Service (PaaS)..., [and] Software as a Service (SaaS)[.]” See
GSA’s Cloud Computing Brochure (and other resources), available at Cloud
IT Services, http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/190333.
• See also, National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
Department of Commerce, Special Publication 500-293 (Draft), US Government Cloud Computing Technology Roadmap (Volumes I and II) (November 2011); National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
DRAFT Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations (May 2011);
GAO, Information Security: Additional Guidance Needed to Address Cloud
Computing Concerns, GAO-12-130T, October 6, 2011.
C. Cybersecurity and Related Issues.
See, generally, Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace
(July 2011), setting forth Five Strategic Initiatives:
© 2012 Thomson Reuters
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•

Treat cyberspace as an operational domain to organize, train,
and equip so that DoD can take full advantage of cyberspace’s
potential;

•

Employ new defense operating concepts to protect DoD networks and systems;

•

Partner with other U.S. government departments and agencies and the private sector to enable a whole-of-government
cybersecurity Strategy;

•

Build robust relationships with U.S. allies and international
partners to strengthen collective cybersecurity; and

•

Leverage the nation’s ingenuity through an exceptional cyber
workforce and rapid technological innovation.

See also, GAO, Cybersecurity: Continued Attention Needed to Protect Our
Nation’s Critical Infrastructure, GAO-11-865T, July 26, 2011; GAO, Cybersecurity: Continued Attention Needed to Protect Our Nation’s Critical
Infrastructure and Federal Information Systems, GAO-11-463T, March
16, 2011 (“Once again, we identified protecting the federal government’s
information systems and the nation’s cyber critical infrastructure as a
governmentwide high-risk area. We have designated federal information
security as a high-risk area since 1997; in 2003, we expanded this highrisk area to include protecting systems supporting our nation’s critical
infrastructure, referred to as cyber critical infrastructure protection or
cyber CIP.”). Cyber Pilot May Expand To More Contractor Networks, DOD
Says, 53 GC ¶ 276 (Through its Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber
Pilot program, DoD shares “classified threat intelligence … with defense
contractors or their commercial internet service providers along with the
know-how to employ it in network defense[.]”); Developments In Brief:
Cyber Pilot to Help DOD, Industry Face Threats, Deputy Secretary Says,
53 GC ¶ 216(b).
VI. A NEW ERA AT DOD: OF REDUCTIONS, PRIORITIES, AND
THE DOD EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY INTIATIVE
From a policy perspective, 2011 was less eventful than 2010, at least
in terms of the Defense Department’s initiatives to squeeze savings, efficiencies, and productivity out of the acquisition regime. The new leadership—primarily former CIA director, now Secretary of Defense, Leon
Panetta—will not drive change as much as the realities and constraints of
the federal budget. Developments In Brief: Senate Confirms Deputy Defense
Secretary, 53 GC ¶ 320(d) (Dr. Carter confirmed as the Deputy Defense
Secretary); Defense Secretary Warns against Broad Cuts, 53 GC ¶ 216(c)
(outgoing [SecDef] Robert Gates [stated] that “we must not repeat the
mistakes of the past, where budget targets were met mostly by taking a
percentage off the top of everything.”). Nonetheless, the volume and pace
of activity have been high, and the scope and breadth of the initiatives
are broad. Defense Secretary Says DOD Must Remain Agile Despite Budget Cuts, 53 GC ¶ 338 (Secretary Panetta warned: “If the congressional
deficit-reduction ‘super committee’ fails to agree on budget cuts, so-called
sequestration ‘would force defense cuts that would do catastrophic damage
to our military and its ability to protect the country[.]’”); In ‘New Era’ DOD
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Will Work With Industry To Get ‘More Without More’, 53 GC ¶ 52 (“Carter
unveiled seven guideposts DOD will follow in considering its new industrial structure.”). We expect dramatic pronouncements about the future
of Defense spending early in 2012 (and throughout the campaign season).
A. Defense Industrial Base and Business Board.
If DoD procurement spending stagnates or, as is more likely, decreases,
attention will continue to turn to the DoD industrial base. On November
18, the House Defense Industrial Base Panel ranged far and wide in its
hearings, as shown by the statements from The Honorable Jacques S.
Gansler, Professor and Roger C. Lipitz Chair, University of Maryland and
David Berteau, CSIS, available at http://csis.org/files/111118_tsBerteau.
pdf; see also, http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/2011/11/creatinga-21st-century-defense-industry. There are no easy solutions to the challenges facing the defense industry, but a number of key steps can be taken
to sustain and retain a healthy industry.
•

We need a clearer articulation of our future national security
strategy, one that can permit better prioritization of budget
and force structure needs and guide reductions.

•

We need a change in incentives, both in DoD and in industry.

•

The government needs to have a better idea of which elements
of the industrial base are most vulnerable and a better way of
including that information in budget decisions.

•

As technology development continues to occur outside the U.S.,
we need an export control regime that recognizes the global
origin of innovation.

What remains unclear at year end is whether the panel’s life will be extended and whether it will develop legislation for the coming year. House
Defense Industrial Base Panel Holds Initial Hearing, 53 GC ¶ 359 (“Rep.
Rick Larsen (D-Wash.), panel ranking member, said ‘DOD must continue
... building a strategic, dynamic contracting process’ to ensure that ‘those
who have great products do not fall by the wayside,’ and one way to do
so is to grow the defense industrial base.”) Barry Watts, senior fellow at
the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) explained
that “the prospects for the continued success of for-profit defense firms in
providing ... superior weaponry and equipment—especially at affordable
costs—may be at risk” unless both the defense industrial base and the
Government’s business practices “undergo fundamental restructuring.”
CSIS’s Pierre Chao cautioned against a “one-size-fits-all mentality” when
promulgating a defense industrial policy. Instead, he suggested viewing
the industry as three constituent parts: (a) emerging technologies and
companies, including those involving mobile applications, cyberspace,
and directed energy; (b) core market, including major defense contractors like Boeing and Lockheed; and (c) legacy businesses, which include
ship, aircraft and tank builders and space launch operations. See also,
Developments in Brief: HASC Establishes Bipartisan Defense Business
Panel, 53 GC ¶ 302(b) (The Panel, led by Reps. Bill Shuster (R-Penn.) and
Rick Larsen (D-Wash.), “is tasked with examining the current defense
business environment and identifying contracting and regulatory issues
© 2012 Thomson Reuters
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facing the defense industry. It will also look at the use of incentives
and mandates to meet established goals, structural challenges facing
various sectors within the industrial base, impact of the current fiscal
environment on industry, opportunities to reduce barriers to entry, and
how [DoD] can encourage expansion of the industrial base and foster
the transition of technology.”)
B. The Tanker Procurement: An Interim Conclusion to a
Never-Ending Major System Acquisition Case Study.
The Obama administration inherited one of the hottest potatoes
imaginable—the future of in-flight refueling for the Air Force. This
incredibly important, high-profile procurement attracted (and, frankly,
merited) extraordinary attention. In 2011, the Air Force finally awarded
a contract that did not result in a successful protest. And The Award For
Best-Value Tanker Goes To ..., 53 GC ¶ 71 (“The Air Force … awarded the
KC-X contract to the Boeing Co., in the Department of Defense’s third
attempt to begin replacing the aging fleet of Eisenhower-era KC-135
aerial refueling tankers. Boeing’s aircraft is designated the KC-46A. The
fixed-price incentive-firm contract for engineering and manufacturing
development is worth over $3.5 billion, and calls for 18 aircraft by 2017.
The overall program is valued at $30 billion plus options.”) What initially appeared to be one of the most dramatic inadvertent disclosures of
proprietary information of the modern era, while embarrassing, proved
neither significant nor fatal. SASC Probes KC-X Data Leak, 53 GC ¶ 37
(In December 2010, “DOD sent the Boeing Co. and European Aeronautic
Defence and Space Co. (EADS) a limited amount of identical information
about each other’s offer following a November 2010 accidental disclosure to EADS.” The disclosure “was accidental and did not violate the
Procurement Integrity Act.”)
By the summer, however, “Boeing … projected … [that it would] exceed
its cost ceiling by as much as $300 million—about 6 percent—on the initial
contract to develop and build Air Force aerial-refueling tankers, according to government officials.” Tony Capaccio, Boeing projected to face $300
million overrun on tanker contract, Seattle Times at http://seattletimes.
nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2015420023_tanker25.html. Then
USD(AT&L) Ash Carter promptly explained: “It’s not our problem because
it’s a fixed contract and it was written with protections for the taxpayer[.]”
Colin Clark, Boeing’s $300M Tanker Overrun Not Pentagon’s Problem:
Ash Carter, available at http://defense.aol.com/2011/07/15/boeings-300mtanker-overrun-not-pentagons-problem-ash-carter/. Time will tell whether
(1) it is, in fact, DoD’s problem or not and (2) whether a slavish resurgence
in fixed-price contracting coupled with strict enforcement best serves the
government’s long-term interests.
C. Boeing and Airbus: Another Arena.
On a tangentially related note, the ongoing US-EU trade battle involving state support for large-scale aircraft development continues to play
out before the World Trade Organization (WTO). Developments In Brief:
WTO Panel Rules Boeing Subsidies Illegal, GC ¶ 321(b) (In a parallel
dispute targeting subsidies to Airbus, a WTO panel ruled in June that
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EU member states’ subsidies to Airbus violated WTO law. See also 52 GC
¶ 228.); Boeing Subsidies Violate WTO Law, Panel Holds, 53 GC ¶ 122
(WTO “dispute-settlement panel … held that certain U.S. federal taxation
schemes, [DoD] and NASA research and development (R&D) funding, and
state tax and non-tax incentives to the Boeing Co. were illegal subsidies
under WTO law”).
D. And, Yes, the A-12.
Last year, we mentioned that the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in the A-12 litigation (originally filed in the COFC in June of 1991), McDonnell Douglas Corp. & General Dynamics Corp. v. United States. The
U.S Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit described this litigation as
the American version of Jarndyce and Jarndyce, the fictional court case
in the Charles Dickens novel Bleak House. (“This scarecrow of a suit
has, in course of time, become so complicated that no man alive knows
what it means.”) The oral argument in this case was not the Court’s
finest hour. Developments In Brief: Supreme Court Hears Arguments on
State Secrets Privilege in A-12 Case, 53 GC ¶ 29(a). Now, following the
Supreme Court’s decision, the case is headed back to the trial court.
State Secrets Privilege Bars Litigation Of Superior Knowledge Theory
In A-12 Case, 53 GC ¶ 177 (“The U.S. Supreme Court … held that the
state secrets defense precludes a civil action if full litigation would lead
to the disclosure of state secrets. …[I]n such a situation, the dispute is
nonjusticiable, and the appropriate judicial action is to leave the parties
‘where we found them on the day they filed suit,’ causing both parties to
be without a judicial remedy. For now, the decision is a partial victory
for both sides.”).
VII. Acquisition Workforce
We applauded both the message and the delivery of that message
by outgoing OFPP Administrator Gordon. Gordon to Leave OFPP, 53
GC ¶ 369(d). And we were pleased that the acquisition workforce was
increasingly, and seriously, addressed—both as a matter of policy and
legislation. Alas, we fear that much work is required, and budgetary
pressure likely will swing the pendulum in the opposite direction. Bills
Seek To Improve Acquisition Workforce Training, 53 GC ¶ 133; Industry
Group Makes Legislative Recommendations, 53 GC ¶ 99 (The Acquisition Reform Working Group (ARWG) “support[s] the efforts to rebuild
the acquisition workforce. Many of the problems with defense and
other agency acquisitions today are the result of severe strains on the
acquisition workforce ‘rather than a lack of appropriate rules and regulations[.]’”) For example, GAO found that DCMA “faces an uphill climb
as it tries to rebuild its workforce after undergoing significant shifts in
its workforce, structure, and policies and procedures over the past 10
years[.]” DCMA Faces Challenges Rebuilding Workforce, GAO Finds, 53
GC ¶ 374. Despite recent progress: “DCMA remains ‘in a state of transition, recovering from years of workforce downsizing that raised serious
concerns about its ability to effectively meet its missions.’ Uncertainty
also remains about ‘whether funding will be available to retain personnel hired using the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund,’
a source of funding for an increasing number of new DCMA employees.”
© 2012 Thomson Reuters
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Unfortunately, focus on the officially designated acquisition workforce
is not enough. DOD Should Better Track, Train Non-DAWIA Acquisition
Personnel, GAO Says, 53 GC ¶ 318 (GAO reviewed 29 DoD services acquisitions and found that fewer than half of the 430 personnel involved were
covered by the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA),
which standardized education, experience and training requirements for
the DOD acquisition workforce. “GAO found that non-DAWIA personnel
perform functions at all stages of the services acquisition life-cycle … as
program managers, [CORs], requirement officials, auditors, legal advisors,
technical experts and financial managers.”).
VIII. TILTING AT WINDMILLS: CONTRACTOR FATALITIES
AND PUBLIC PERCEPTION, REDUX
By the end of 2011, more than 2,700 contractors had died in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Kuwait. We continue to be frustrated that these extraordinarily high contractor fatalities (and injuries) remained almost entirely
outside the public’s consciousness. Among other things, we believe that,
in a representative democracy, public awareness of the human cost of our
nation’s security and foreign policies is critical. A significant body of research suggests that the public is at least somewhat sensitive to military
casualties, and we continue to wonder what impacts, if any, derive from
a significant substitution of contractor deaths for military fatalities. See,
generally, Steven L. Schooner & Collin D. Swan, Dead Contractors: The
Un-Examined Effect of Surrogates on the Public’s Casualty Sensitivity, 5
J. of Nat’l Sec. L. & Pol’y ___ (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1826242.
The Labor Department continues to earn kudos for transparency for
posting on the Internet the data it generates based upon claims filed
under the Defense Base Act and the War Hazards Compensation Act,
which make contractor employees eligible for worker’s compensation
benefits pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation
Act. See generally www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/lsdbareports.htm. We also
heartily applaud the Congressionally-mandated Commission on Wartime
Contracting (CWC) for breaking new ground, bucking the trend of both
Republican and Democratic administrations, and acknowledging that
contractor sacrifice merits the public’s attention.
The extensive use of contractors obscures the full human cost
of war. The full cost includes all casualties, and to neglect
contractor deaths hides the political risks of conducting overseas
contingency operations. In particular, significant contractor
deaths and injuries have largely remained uncounted and
unpublicized by the U.S. government and the media….
The recent withdrawal of combat units from Iraq and the
surge in Afghanistan have resulted in increased contractor
casualties. Between June 2009 and March 2011, contractor
deaths, including local- and third-country nationals, exceeded
the military’s in both countries. Moreover, contractor deaths
are undoubtedly higher than the reported total because federal
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statistics are based on filed insurance claims, and many foreign
contractors’ employees may be unaware of their insurance rights
and therefore unlikely to file for compensation.

Commission on Wartime Contracting, Final Report to Congress: Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks at 30-31
(August 2011) (footnotes and citations omitted), available at http://www.
wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_FinalReport-lowres.pdf. See also, David Isenberg, Contratistas Desaparecidos, Huffington Post (October 10,
2011) (“While … I have frequently been critical of [private military security] use as a policy I am absolutely disgusted by the way their ultimate
sacrifice has been airbrushed out of the official record.”).
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